INFRA Signal 203
BGP ORIGIN attribute manipulation and its impact on the Internet
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Network operators relying on BGP path selection should understand that ORIGIN values are routinely falsified by transit providers seeking traffic advantages, undermining the reliability of route selection logic. This manipulation creates a revenue-driven arms race where RFC compliance puts operators at a competitive disadvantage, distorting traffic engineering outcomes across the Internet.
Written by elseif from the cluster below · every claim links back to a sourceThe three things worth knowing
Approximately 70% of observed BGP paths have their ORIGIN attribute rewritten by transit providers, violating RFC4271 guidance that ORIGIN should not be modified after being set by the originating AS.
Transit providers manipulate ORIGIN to IGP (the lowest, most preferred value) to attract traffic to their links, exploiting ORIGIN's early position in the BGP path selection algorithm after Local Preference and AS_PATH length.
Cloudflare argues for deprecating the ORIGIN attribute in route selection, as the practice has become so widespread that operators face pressure to rewrite ORIGIN themselves simply to remain competitive.
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