TECH Signal 364
Frida-based relay bypasses Android hardware attestation by routing requests to a clean device
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Illustration only Photo by Declan Sun on Unsplash
A Quarkslab article demonstrates a bypass of Android hardware key attestation that relays attestation requests from a rooted analyst phone to an unmodified device, then splices the genuine signed certificate chain back into the target app via Frida instrumentation.
Hardware attestation is the primary mechanism banking apps, payment wallets, and identity SDKs use to reject rooted or tampered devices, and it is designed to be unforgeable without breaking the secure hardware itself. This bypass sidesteps that problem entirely by redirecting who gets asked, which means app developers cannot assume that a valid attestation chain corresponds to the device actually running the app. A companion repository makes the full setup reproducible, lowering the barrier for analysts and potentially for attackers.
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The bypass does not attack secure hardware, extract keys, or require a leaked keybox; it relays the attestation request to a clean device and splices the returned certificate chain into the target app with a Frida hook.
The article targets modern devices running Android 13 and later, covering the shift from factory-injected attestation keys to Remote Key Provisioning (RKP) and noting where StrongBox changes the picture.
A companion GitHub repository ships the validation backend, demo apps, and Frida instrumentation so the entire setup can be inspected and reproduced rather than taken on faith.
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