TECH Signal 316
Amateur radio operator proposes signed cleartext protocol for mesh networks
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Illustration only Photo by Declan Sun on Unsplash
A radio amateur argues that current mesh networks like Meshtastic and Meshcore are too restrictive for licensed users, proposing a protocol where messages are signed but transmitted in cleartext to enable legal filtering and identity verification.
This proposal highlights a tension between consumer-friendly mesh tools and regulatory compliance for licensed operators. While signing adds identity assurance, it introduces significant bandwidth overhead and requires a Public Key Infrastructure that may not scale well in ad-hoc environments.
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The author argues that default encryption in Meshtastic and Meshcore prevents licensed amateur radio operators from using primary status bands with higher power limits.
A signed cleartext protocol would allow repeater operators to filter out unlicensed users, facilitating legal operation, but it removes privacy and exposes messages to public dumping.
Implementing this approach requires a Public Key Infrastructure and adds 64 bytes per message for ed25519 signatures, creating a bandwidth cost and a barrier to entry via licensing exams.
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The core issue is not the existence of mesh networks, but their default security posture. Meshtastic and Meshcore prioritize encryption, which the author finds cumbersome or impossible to disable effectively. This design choice locks out a specific user base: licensed radio amateurs who operate under regulations that require identifiable, often unencrypted, transmissions on certain bands. The author’s frustration stems from the mismatch between consumer-grade privacy defaults and professional or licensed operational requirements.
The proposed solution trades privacy for accountability and regulatory compliance. By signing messages in cleartext, the protocol ensures that identity is verifiable and that repeater operators can filter out unlicensed traffic. This makes legal operation easier in congested bands. However, the trade-off is severe: there is no privacy other than non-participation, and any user can dump all signed messages online. The author acknowledges this downside but prioritizes the ability to operate legally and identify peers.
The technical implementation faces significant hurdles. The author notes that verifying signatures requires a Public Key Infrastructure, which is difficult to manage in ad-hoc mesh environments. Key-parties scale poorly, and Certificate Authorities introduce political complexities. Additionally, the bandwidth cost is non-trivial; using ed25519 adds 64 bytes per message, which is a substantial overhead for low-power, low-bandwidth radio links. This cost must be weighed against the benefit of identity verification.
The author explicitly rejects the suggestion to use APRS, a standard for amateur radio data, without providing a technical reason, citing only a refusal. This dismissal suggests that the issue is not just about the protocol mechanics but about the user experience and the specific constraints of modern mesh hardware. The proposal is less a technical specification and more a call for a new category of mesh protocol that accommodates licensed operators without forcing them into consumer-grade encryption defaults.
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