INFRA Signal 160
Memory exposure during sleep and cold-boot attacks prompts secure suspension for LUKS-encrypted disks
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Illustration only Photo by Tyler on Unsplash
A laptop's memory remains readable during sleep and after power loss, prompting efforts to securely suspend LUKS-encrypted disks.
When a system suspends, encryption keys often reside in memory, making them vulnerable to physical extraction. The article discusses securing LUKS-encrypted disks against direct memory access and cold-boot attacks, though the specific implementation details are not provided in the available material.
Written by elseif from the cluster below · every claim links back to a sourceThe three things worth knowing
A laptop's memory is not unreadable while it is asleep.
Tooling can attach to the memory bus to read out its contents.
Cold-boot attacks can theoretically read memory values for a short time after power loss.
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