Browser vendors propose multiple low-effort security hardening measures

The article presents a collection of browser security improvements that can be implemented in less than one developer day each. These ideas target areas where security has been sacrificed for usability or compatibility. By focusing on low-effort changes, the author suggests that browsers can quickly reduce their attack surface. The list is framed as a modest starting point rather than a comprehensive overhaul.

Specific proposals include blocking random sites from entering fullscreen without explicit user permission and giving administrators granular control over which file types may be downloaded. Another set of ideas calls the Windows AMSI interface to scan clipboard contents, extension code, and browser restarts for malicious behavior. Additionally, the article recommends disabling or warning on UserInfo in URLs and javascript: navigation, and tightening notification permissions to curb spam and spam.

Because each item is described as achievable in a short time, the engineering cost is primarily limited to planning and testing rather than large-scale refactoring. Many of the suggestions reuse existing operating system mechanisms, such as AMSI, which means browsers do not need to build new detection engines from scratch. Enterprises can enforce the download-type controls through group policy or similar management tools.

The measures do not guarantee protection against all threats; a determined attacker may still find ways to bypass them, for example by using socially engineered downloads or exploiting zero-day bugs. Their effectiveness also depends on users granting or denying prompts correctly and on administrators applying policies consistently. Finally, if the underlying OS lacks the relevant security hooks, some of the AMSI-based checks would not function.